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EEOC v. QUALITY PORK PROCESSORS, INC.,
No. 01-143, 2002 WL 202452 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2002)
FACTS
On December 21, 1998, Quality Pork Processors (QPP) hired April
Landers to work in its plant in Austin, Minnesota.' QPP assigned Landers to
the skinning room, where Landers worked with thirty to thirty-five co-
workers, including Steve Guitierrez and Tha Ir.2 In January, 1999,
Guitierrez began to make racially derogatory remarks to Landers regarding
her boyfriend, William Matlock, a black man.3 Guitierrez referred to
Landers as a "nigger lover" and asked her questions such as "How is your
nigger doing? 4  Guitierrez made these comments on a daily basis
encompassing the entire period that Guitierrez and Landers worked
together.' Im also made racially insensitive comments toward Landers
regarding Matlock.6 Occasionally, the remarks caused Landers to cry in the
restroom.7 Landers repeatedly asked Guitierrez and Im to stop making the
remarks.'
Near the end of April, 1999, Landers complained about the racial
remarks to Roger Hansen, her immediate supervisor. 9  Hansen did not
respond to the complaint 0 and on May 6, 1999, Landers met with the
director of human resources, Dale Wicks." Landers explained to Wicks that
her co-workers referred to her boyfriend as a "nigger" and that Hansen had
failed to rectify the situation.' 2  According to QPP, Wicks then asked
Landers for Guitierrez and Im's names in order to start an investigation, but
Landers refused to identify them.
13
On May 7, 1999, Ricky Faith, the general foreman of the night shift,
and Jim Hoffman, the night superintendent, met with Landers to discuss the
racial slurs.'4 They also discussed the fact that Hansen had prohibited





6 Id. Im testified that he only referred to Matlock as a "nigger" once and that was in response to Landers
confessing to him that Matlock had hit her. The court made no reference to how many times Landers
claimed Im made racially insensitive remarks to her.71id.
Sld.
91Id.
10 Hansen claimed that Landers never came to speak with him about the remarks.
"Id. at *1-2.
12 Id. at *2.
13 id.
14 id.
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Landers from working overtime hours. 5 Consequently, Faith and Hoffman
restored the overtime hours that Hansen had taken from Landers.' 6 On May
10, 1999, QPP transferred Landers to the newly created position of fecal
contamination inspector.' 7  As the fecal contamination inspector, Landers
was responsible for inspecting each side of pork for fecal matter, specks of
grease, and pieces of liver, kidney, or lung.' 8
Landers complained about the transfer to Emil Laack, Jr., the night
union steward.' 9 Landers informed Laack that Hansen had not responded to
her complaint regarding the racial remarks.20  Approximately two weeks
later, on May 26, 1999, Landers, Laack, and Wicks met to discuss Hansen's
lack of response. 2' At this meeting, Landers expressed her belief that her
transfer had resulted from her complaints about Hansen not addressing the
remarks.22
QPP eliminated the position of fecal contamination inspector in late
June and transferred Landers to a position in the livestock pens on August
16, 1999.23 Prior to this transfer, Landers filed complaints with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against QPP and the union.24
On August 29, 1999, Landers met with union officials in a mediated
settlement conference.25  The union representatives determined that
Guitierrez and Im had made racially insensitive remarks to Landers.26 The
union posted warning slips in their files and both Guitierrez and Im
apologized to Landers. 27 Landers quit her job on July 13, 200128 and EEOC
commenced this suit, claiming a racially hostile work environment and
retaliation by QPP in response to Landers's complaints.29 QPP then
1d.
16 Id. The court made no indication what steps, if any, Faith and Hoffman agreed to take regarding the
racial slurs.
17 Id. The court did not state what Landers's position was prior to the transfer, other than to say that she






22 Id. The court stated that according to QPP, Landers, again, refused to identify Guitierrez and Im to
Wicks.
23 Id. at *3. The court made no indication of any incidents or events, if any, that took place at QPP with






28 Id. The court provided no information about why Landers quit her job.
29 ld. at *1.
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motioned for summary judgment, alleging that Landers had failed to
establish essential elements of either cause of action.30
HOLDING
The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota granted
in part and denied in part QPP's motion for summary judgment. The court
held that, based on the evidence presented, a jury could find that the conduct
complained of was of such a nature to create a racially hostile work
environment. 31 However, the court also held that EEOC did not establish
sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that Landers's transfer was
a retaliatory act.32
ANALYSIS
The court examined the standard of review for granting summary
judgment. In general, the court will grant summary judgment if, looking at
the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.3 3 The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that the material
facts are undisputed.34 However, the nonmoving party must show specific
facts that are material to an essential element of the claim at issue that a
genuine issue for trial exists. 35 The court will grant summary judgment if the
nonmoving party cannot support an essential element of its claim because,
without the support, all other facts are immaterial.
36
The court turned to EEOC's first claim that QPP created a racially
hostile work environment. Title VII states that it is "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 37 The court interpreted "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment" to mean that Congress intended to encompass all
discriminatorily hostile or abuse work environments affecting all people.38
30 id.
3' Id. at *6.
32 Id. at *7.




37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2002).
's EEOC v. Quality Pork Processors, Inc., No. 01-143, 2002 WL 202452, at *4 (D. Minn. Feb. 1,2002).
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The court stated that Title VII is violated in the workplace when the
discriminatory remarks severely alter the conditions of employment.
39
The court stated that EEOC had to establish five elements to be
successful on its racially hostile work environment claim: (1) Landers was a
member of a protected group,4 ° (2) Landers was subjected to unwelcome
harassment, (3) the harassment was based on race, (4) the harassment
affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and (5) QPP knew or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take expeditious and
adequate measures to eliminate the harassment. 41 The court stated that the
fourth factor has both a subjective and an objective element.42 Therefore,
EEOC had to establish that the behavior subjectively affected Landers and
that the behavior created an objectively hostile work environment.4 3
QPP contended that Guitierrez's and Im's comments were not severe
or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile work environment. 44
The court stated that it had to examine the entirety of conduct at the
workplace and not focus on one or two isolated instances when examining a
claim for a racially hostile work environment. 45  Additionally, the court
would examine the location of other people and the frequency and severity of
the discriminatory conduct.46 The court would also determine whether the
conduct was physically threatening or humiliating.47 Finally, the court would
determine if the conduct prevented the targeted individual from completing
his or her work.4' Landers did not allege that the comments were physically
threatening or humiliating, that the comments affected her job performance,
or that other racially motivated incidents occurred at QPP outside of the
comments by Guitierrez and Im.49  However, Landers claimed that
Guitierrez's comments were louder when other workers were present and
that those workers laughed at his comments.50
The court summarized the evidence in support of the allegation that
two co-workers had made racially offensive comments on a daily basis for
four months despite Landers's repeated requests that they refrain from
39 id.
40 QPP did not argue that Landers was not among the class Congress envisioned to protect when drafting
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making such comments.5' The court distinguished the case from Carter v.
Chrysler Corp,52 in which the plaintiff received sexual gestures, sexual
insults written on walls, and threatening notes for two years.5 3 Here, the
conduct included only verbal remarks from two co-workers.5 4 Additionally,
the court distinguished the case from Ross v. Douglas County, Nebraska55
and Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co.56 In those cases, supervisors made
racially derogatory remarks over a period of years and the conduct included
other racial comments and jokes made in the presence of the plaintiffs.5 7
Here, the conduct lasted for a period of six months and supervisors did not
make the remarks.58 Nevertheless, the court held that, based on the evidence
presented, a reasonable jury could find that QPP had subjected Landers to a
racially hostile work environment and denied QPP's motion for summary
judgment on this claim.59
The court next turned its attention to the claim of retaliation. Under
Title VII, EEOC had to demonstrate that Landers's activity was protected
and that she endured a negative employment action. 60 EEOC also had to
establish a casual connection between the wrong and the protected activity.6'
The court stated that under Ledergerber v. Stangler,62 a job transfer
involving minor changes in working conditions and no changes in pay or
benefits was not enough to sustain a claim of adverse employment action.63
QPP argued that the transfer contained only minor changes in Landers's
working conditions and that Landers's hours, salary, and benefits remained
the same. 64 Furthermore, QPP argued that the working conditions of the two
positions were virtually identical and that Landers's new job was not as
physically demanding as her old job.65
51id.
52 Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 1999).
53 EEOC v. Quality Pork Processors, Inc., No. 01-143,2002 WL 202452, at *5 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2002).
54 id.
55 Ross v. Douglas County, Neb., 234 F.3d 391 (8th Cir. 2000). In Ross, plaintiff worked for over a year
at a county correctional facility where plaintiffs supervisor continually addressed plaintiff as "nigger" or
"black boy."
56 Delph v. Dr. Pepper Bottling Co., 130 F.3d 349 (8th Cir. 1997). Here, plaintiffs supervisor repeatedly
called plaintiff "nigger," "token black boy," or "my little black boy." Additionally, plaintiffs co-workers
made racial slurs and jokes directed at plaintiff.





62 Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997).
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Landers argued that her new position prevented her from taking
regularly scheduled breaks because she had to secure a replacement while
she was not on the line.66 The court dismissed this argument because QPP
did not prevent Landers from taking breaks.67 The court stated that the
requirement of finding a replacement did not create a materially significant
disadvantage to Landers or create an adverse employment action.68 Landers
next argued that, as fecal contamination inspector, her responsibilities
diminished because she would examine the hogs after thirty-two other people
examined the hog.69 Therefore, the hog was sufficiently examined before it
came to her.70  The court dismissed this argument because no evidence
supported the inference that the hog was sufficiently inspected before it came
to Landers.7"
Finally, Landers claimed to be the victim of other retaliatory acts, such
as misplacement of her paycheck, shock by an electric prod, tears in her
laundry bag that led to the loss of work clothing, and the loss of air in the tire
on her car. 2 QPP argued, and the court agreed, that Landers could link these
events to a protected activity and that the claims were unexhausted and fell
outside the purview of the retaliation charge.73 The court stated that no
evidence suggested that the acts were retaliatory outside of what Landers
felt, and that Landers's subjective feelings did not qualify as a valid standard
of review. Based on the presented evidence, the court concluded that no
reasonable jury could find QPP's transfer of Landers to be an adverse
employment action and granted QPP's motion for summary judgment on that
claim.75
CONCLUSION
The court's decision may have set a precedent to expanding the
number of people and types of claims that Title VII encompasses. In this
case, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment motion
when the targeted individual was white and the racially derogatory






" Id. at *6-7.
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fact that the co-workers had made the racially derogatory remarks for a
period of only six months and the targeted individual had made no formal
complaints until after the company transferred the target to an area away
from the harassing co-workers.
This claim is significantly weaker than other claims brought under
Title VII in the Eighth Circuit. In Ross and Delph, the court dealt with cases
of prolonged activities of racial abuse directed toward a black employee by
his immediate supervisor. In the instant case, no racially derogatory remarks
were made about Landers; instead, the remarks were directed at her
boyfriend. 76 Additionally, Landers's co-workers made all of the racially
derogatory remarks. Landers's supervisors did not participate in the alleged
harassment, other than Landers's claim that they failed to prevent her co-
workers from making such remarks. Even this claim seems tenuous in that
QPP claimed that Landers would not identify the names of the co-workers.
In Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc.,7 the court stated that
the employer must know or reasonably should know of the racial harassment
and take adequate action necessary to stop the harassment. 7' Here, the court
stated that Landers refused to identify the harassing co-workers when Wicks
specifically asked Landers during their meetings.79 QPP would have trouble
stopping the harassing behavior if QPP did not know who to direct necessary
action toward.
This case presents the possibility that courts will have less tolerance
for any racially charged hostile work environment, regardless of whether
discriminatory remarks are directed at an employee or made to that employee
about someone else. The court found that a reasonable jury could find a
racially hostile work environment based on the mere presence of racially
derogatory remarks.80 This decision may expand Title VII to include a cause
of action for any person, in any work environment, based on the fact that
racially derogatory remarks are present. The court did not decide whether
Landers was a member of the group that Congress had intended to protect,
due to QPP's concession that Landers had standing to bring the claim.8'
Thus, in a similar case, a plaintiff might find itself barred from recovery if
the defendant is not as willing as QPP to concede that the plaintiff is among
76 Id. at * 1.
77 Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, Inc., 302 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2002).
71 id. at 844.
79 EEOC v. Quality Pork Processors, Inc., No. 01-143, 2002 WL 202452, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 1, 2002).
There was discrepancy regarding whether or not Landers had informed Hansen of the harassment.
Landers said that she had informed Hansen, but Hansen refuted the claim.
"0 Id. at *6.
8 ' Id. at *4.
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the statutorily protected class. It is important to note that although Title VII
prohibits employers from creating a work environment that is hostile toward
women, the claim in this case was not gender based, but race based.
Although Landers may be a member of a protected class under Title VII, she
is not automatically included under the class protected in racially hostile
work environment claims.
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